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Introduction
Dogmatism as a spiritual principle becomes reality when one class of principles,
knowledge or methods is taken as universal, as a sole origin, as the only form
of knowledge and as the only methodological class, etc. in order to reach Tru t h ,
Righteousness and Intelligence.
Feyerabend, like other critics in all spheres of scientism, from the scienti-
fic-methodological to the socio-political sphere, talks about the dangers tow a rd s
which a dogmatism of scientific mind and methods is leading. According to
Fe yerabend «the conception of one unique system of criteria which has always
been leading towards success and is still leading towards it», with no concern
to its pragmatism and utility, creates the basis for spiritual monolithism and
totalitarianism. Just like other forms of dogmatism, this form in its incorporation
by a state becomes a state ideology. As such, it becomes inauspicious for furt h e r
d e velopment of science, because it pre vents the existence and development of
other spiritual contents, i.e. spiritual and theoretical pluralism. No n - e x i s t e n c e
of spiritual-theoretical pluralism has unfavourable spiritual-scientific, socio-
political, ethical and other consequences. The road tow a rds the stre n g t h e n i n g
of science opens tow a rds all possible spiritually theoretical and methodological
a p p roaches to reality which have been re s e a rched. Scientific dogmatism and
sectarianism are eliminating alternative forms of knowledge and centuries-
long traditions of non-western nations and civilisations; all of «seething com-
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Literaturaplexity» (Peter Sl o t e rdijak) is being thought of in one way, contrary to its re a l
ontological heterogeneity.
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This methodology of thinking has and has been producing specifically ade-
quate political philosophy and social reality of «a conflict of worlds», «a con-
flict of civilisations» (S.P. Hungtington), civilised and nationally cultural elitism,
political monism, totalitarianism and aristocraticism.
A modern unity of science and the state is safeguarding the western hege-
m o n y. This is the method and the instrument of a specific «political» occu-
pation, the occupation «void of blood». «Tribes are not just physically oppre s s e d ,
they are forced to accept religion of brotherly love - Christianity» (Fe ye r a b e n d ,
p. 397). Both tradition and contemporaneity in non-western nations are mar-
ginal in eve ry aspect; the strong west-centralist subjectivism has been cre a t e d .
The No n - western has become the Other in the entire meaning of that con-
cept, «The Other» (Ma rtin Buber), «The Other Is Hell» (J . P. Sa rt re), Ir r a t i o n a l ,
Oriental, Un reliable, Weak, Im p u re, Un d e veloped, Unhistorical, Fo re i g n ,
Other Me (Fichte), Non-intellect, etc. «Europe has to learn so much more in
o rder to establish a dialogic community. But the world as a whole is, neve r-
theless, going to succeed one day, because it is going to be forced on it. As a mat-
ter of fact, all world's cultures, including those which sprang from differe n t
religions than ours, are, so to speak, sewn into each other through the influen-
ce of the world economy. That is the reason that we have to learn to commu-
nicate. It has never been like that before» (Hans George Gadamer).
«The end of history» (F. Fukuyama) as an Id e o l o g y, Powe r, the contrast
b e t ween Subject and Object, Damnation of the Ot h e r, «Anthro p o g e n i c
Craving» (A. Kojev), includes implicitly and asks for non-scientific intellect,
intellectual, methodological and every other pluralism.
The condition of a possible future of the human being is in rethinking of
our attitudes «towards all ideas which the rationalists would like to see wiped
out from the face of the Earth» (C. F. von Weizsacker), thinking about myth,
magic, religion, metaphysics; rethinking of our attitudes tow a rds «Su b j e c t u m »
who is an Eu ropean, but in the last 200 years a white American as well, tow a rd s
a «computer intellect», and «technology» as to the only progress, towards the
world of «technology as to the completed metaphysics» (Heidegger), towards
«the power of thinking» (Bacon), tow a rds «the scientific-intellectualism and
the power of thinking where there is no place for ironical thinking» (R. Ro rt y ) ,
or for the Other in any shape or form. «Intellect cannot be universal, and Un -
intellect cannot be excluded.» (Feyerabend)
In the work «Against the Method», as in other papers, articles and essays,
Feyerabend subjects to criticism:
a) the relationship of scientific method and reality, theory and facts, and 
b) totalitarian character of scientific method.
Fe yerabend with his criticism of rigidity and strictness of scientific me-
thod, is striving to present, at the worst, its metaphysical aspiration and desire
to discover unchangeable principles and facts of eve rything that exists or of
existing parts which are explored. Objectivity and rationalism of science pre-
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sent chimera according to Feyerabend. He is longing to direct a plea for epis-
temological relativism and pluralism.
Western enlightenment Today
The need for enlightenment is strongly present even today. At times that need
was demonstrated and related in connection with church institutions and re l i-
gion, but today it is demonstrated and related in re f e rence to writer's scien-
tism, to the reign of experts and to the method of natural sciences. «Today the
triumph of science is something like religion, something that is understood
by itself, the illusion which is blindly worshipped.» The social status of scien-
ce, which is fully expressed in positivism of all versions, determines and con-
ditions the new contemporary contents of enlightenment. Nowadays, the
self-solution of a man and society in re g a rd to their self-blamed immaturity,
consists of their aspiration to free science from fetishism and its spirit of ratio-
nalism. Howe ve r, the process of coming out from self-blamed immaturity is
not simple or effortless. It is not simple or effortless for many reasons:
1) because of strength and force of scientism's fetishism, and
2) because the contemporary enlightenment does not posses a unique and
common attitude about the way out of today's self-blamed immaturity.
The main question for today's enlightenment is not: «Is there a need to
free scientism from fetishism or not?», but «How to do it?».
All in all, one thing is certain and sure, which is that the spirit of today's
enlightenment is not anti-scientism, the rejecting and questioning of science
and rationalism. The senselessness and re a c t i o n a ry nature of anti-scientism
are absolute and certain. Science is an indispensable condition of man's con-
t e m p o r a ry existence. Today the spirit of enlightenment is not and it cannot
be pleading and the recommendation of ignorance, opposition to knowledge
or the protection of ignorance. On the contrary, the spirit of the contemporary
enlightenment is in estimation and evaluation of knowledge and science, con-
sidering that they are broadening human possibilities, and making human life
worthy, but also considering what the man is receiving from them.
Many contemporary philosophers with various views of the world, as E.
Husserl, J. Habermas, W. Di l t h e y, M. Ha i d e g g e r, H. Ma rcuse, P. Fe ye r a b e n d ,
J. Franklin, G. Fre y, H. Ga d a m e r, Z. Bauman, C. Ta y l o r, R. Ro rty and many
others, have informed us that science is not the only knowledge, and that next
to it and together with it there are other forms of knowledge —although less
powerful and with weaker social authority and influence. They have pointed
out that science has numerous advantages in relation to other forms of per-
ception, but at the same time it carries with itself various and numerous defects.
They are opposed to the contemporary scientific and social mythology of scien-
ce and its rationality, placing us in front of the question of mutual re l a t i o n s h i p
and of connection between some contemporary forms of evil, mysticism and
irrationalism, and of «rationalism of science».
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In a particular way, they are criticising the contemporary absolutism of
science, which has been based and produced from rationalism, as the only re a l
measure of Freedom, Truth and Justice. They are opposed to the contempo-
raneous social and national absolutism and to the mythology of science, which
make the science into an ideology. By pointing out to the present pluralism
of perc e p t i ve forms, which is at the same time unavoidably necessary, they are
making scientific knowledge re l a t i ve by criticising science as an ideology, and
by diverting the attention to the relationship between rationalism —as a me-
thodical perception of the foundation of knowledge— and some forms of evil:
Non-freedom, Injustice, Untruth...
In this contemporary period, knowledge has become the most powe rf u l
and the most effective ideology because the state and science have become uni-
ted. Not only with the state's control of science in different ways, but also with
the finding in scence by western state the only certain foundation of one's ow n
survival and strength, and that science and the state have become assimilated
—that is, that science have become dogmatized. Science, in the contempo-
rary period in the West, has gained the same socio-national status which reli-
gion had at one time. With the transformation of science into an ideology,
with its development as an ideology, which had been acquired by its assimi-
lation with the state, science has become «the latest, the most aggre s s i ve and the
most dogmatic religious institution». Science is, according to its essence, the
culmination of the western rationalism. The western civilisation, with its scien-
tifically technical domination in the world, has achieved a reign of the West.
In other words, the reign of the West, and of its science —scientifically tech-
nical and technocratic science— have for its consequence the exclusion of non-
western nations and their cultures. Fe yerabend shows, with his analysis of
West's rationally dogmatic contents and character of science, that science is
in its essence a reign, and that it is limiting human freedom and human cre a-
tive spontaneity. Science is power.
The power of science has been shown in a social and in an individual exis-
tence of man as well. Science with its practical knowledge, in its striving for
application, practicality and usefulness, aspires tow a rds a distinctive organisa-
tion of social as well as individual human life. In the contemporary period,
both man and society believe in a power of emancipation and satisfaction of
science without criticism. An aspiration of man and society to arrange and
s t ru c t u re each segment of their existence on scientific foundations and principles,
is general and strongly manifested. It is certain that science brings and con-
tributes to the humanisation of man and society, that it contributes to human
p ro g ress and pro s p e r i t y, and that science is an integral part and a primary sour-
ce of the human's emancipation in the new century. Today, science has esta-
blished such a place in the man's life and in his culture, and has been achieving
that more and more with each day, that nowadays every attempt to question
science seems impossible, and in the future it will be even more impossible.Nowadays science is present in the life of man and society, not only in the
sense of perception, in the sense of discove ry of the World, Na t u re, Man, and
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Society, but also in the sense that «everything today is functioning according
to the scientific organisation». All critics of contemporary science and of the
scientific method value highly all that, and that is the reason that they do not
s u p p o rt anti-scientism; not because its possibility to be realised is practically una-
c h i e vable, unrealistic, and impossible, but because they estimate that science is
a way of emancipation of man and society. Howe ve r, those critics are suppor-
t i ve of the demystification of science and of its socio-national authority. In
their perception of the relationship between science and the man, they do not
h a ve for their starting point the unconditional and uncritical absolute belief
in an emancipatory function of science, but a rationally critical perception of
the formerly mentioned functions and of science's tyrannous and conquera-
ble consequences for the man and the society. Together with a belief which
has been created on the basis of practice that science has an emancipation func-
tion in the society, they have comprehended another real factual condition
that is showing the possibilities to contort science, to misuse it, to turn it
against the man and to humiliate him, to somehow take away his freedom and
d i g n i t y, to turn him in a personal caricature and «an unpleasant strong machi-
ne with no attraction or humour». The contemporary criticism of science does
not propagate anti-scientism, it does not intercede in favour of obscurantism
and ignorance, but contemporary criticism offers us a criticism of «science's
religion», and questions it. The religion of science identifies the technologi-
cal prosperity with the prosperity of humanity. The religion of science is not
capable of thinking of itself critically, to think against its own schematics and
metaphysics. Its suicidal narcissism, that transfers into a special sort of irra-
tionalism, is based on the fetish of technological pro g ress, and from that to
the pro g ress in general —to the social pro g ress. That scientific uncritical accep-
tance of itself and of its consequences gives the motive to the contemporary
criticism of scientific method to talk about modern «religion of science». All con-
t e m p o r a ry critics of scientific method lead down to the critique of scientifi-
c a l l y - t h e o retical methodism, to the idea of a single universal and a commonly
accepted methodology.
Their critique of the contemporary scientific methodology and ideology
has a general character. All of previously mentioned thinkers hold the same
position for their starting point, although they have different views of the
world; that position is in the assumption that if nothing absolute exists, whet-
her in anthological or in gnostic sense, then anything could become possible
in eve ry sphere. The general relativism has opened the space for human's unre s-
tricted activity, but epistemological relativism pre vents rational or any other
dogmatism. Their criticism of the scientific rationalism is at the same time
the critics of its dogmatism. The rationalism and dogmatism of science conve r g e .
They are the base of the contemporary totalitarianism. The pragmatic instu-
mentalisation of science takes away its emancipatory dimension and trans-
forms it into a power of maltreatment and tyranny of various forms and
contents. The science is, with the pragmatic instrumentalism, transformed
into a power of reign and rule. Taking under the consideration not only the
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e m a n c i p a t o ry but also the social dimension of science, contemporary critics
of scientific method and science as of an ideology, are using their influence
for bre a k d own of method and of cognitive course of the governing sciences,
and for demythologising of the sense of wholeness, Progress, cognition, con-
finement...
Scientism of scientific method
The main reason for science to be science and the reason for which science is
what it is, is scientism (of scientific knowledge and of scientific methodology)
t ow a rd the way that leads to knowledge and of the way through which know-
ledge is acquired.
Science is most generally, most bro a d l y, which means most indefinitely,
determined as an assembly of methodically acquired and systematically orde-
red knowledge. According to that, science is understood as:
1. on the one hand, a scientific way, mode, and method of acquiring know-
ledge, and
2. on the other hand, a sole knowledge that is acquired and reached thro u g h
a scientific way.
Science is the sole scientific methodology through which the know l e d g e
is acquired, and also is the sole knowledge which is acquired by the scientific
methodology.
A possibility of practical or scientific verification and a possibility of prac-
tical application of knowledge are the things that shape the scientific metho-
dology and the scientific knowledge. A possibility of verification of science's
accuracy and authenticity, on the one hand, and a possibility of practical appli-
cation, on the other hand, re p resent the main characteristics and the main
quality features of the scientific knowledge. For all that, the practical use of
the scientific knowledge is the main, today maybe even the only, meaning of
the scientism of knowledge, and even the only meaning of knowledge as know-
ledge in general.
C o n s e q u e n t l y, the «differentia specifica» of the scientific knowledge and
of other sorts of knowledge is practically a material applicability, and a possi-
bility of technically practical verification of the scientific knowledge. Scientific
k n owledge includes implicitly and denotes practical applicability, and also the
possibility of its scientific verification. The scientific verification of the scien-
tific knowledge has become more expre s s i ve and present with the deve l o p-
ment of science. The faster development of the scientific knowledge is achieve d
by more expanded, more expre s s i ve, higher and more compre h e n s i ve ve r i f i-
cation of scientific knowledge, and inversely, with the development, and the
enlargement of the scientific knowledge, the scientific verification of the scien-
tific knowledge in the same way has become more compre h e n s i ve and more
p resent. The presence of science in a scientific cognition and methodology
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p resents «conditio sine qua non» of knowledge itself, of the scientific know-
ledge itself. The scientific knowledge itself indirectly and directly depends, on
its way to the scientific knowledge on the applicability of knowledge. There f o re ,
it becomes understandable and clear to what purpose and how is the deve-
lopment of the scientific knowledge accelerated during the application of scien-
ce into science; in other words, that is the reason that the enlargement of
scientific knowledge itself is nowadays ve ry present and extremely expre s s e d
with the application of technology as an applied knowledge in scientific re s e-
arches and cognition.
T h e re f o re, when we talk about science we should differentiate, for peda-
gogical and educational reasons:
1. on the one hand, the scientific knowledge itself, and 
2. on the other hand, scientific methodology with which the scientific know-
ledge is acquired.
For all that, it is important to emphasise their mutual dependence and
connection, the scientific knowledge includes implicitly in itself the scientific
m e t h o d o l o g y, while the scientific methodology includes scientism implicitly
in itself.
A long time ago and with valid arguments, Hegel pointed out that a unity
and homogeneity between knowledge and its method is present in science and
in other shapes of human's spiritual cre a t i v i t y. Science is a science according to
its method and method's scientism, and according to its knowledge and know-
ledge's scientism. Philosophy is philosophy according to its way of manifes-
tation, shape and existence, and according to its shape and a sort of know l e d g e
which is acquired and manifested. It is the same with art and religion. An art i s-
tic cognition is expressed by art, a philosophic cognition is expressed by phi-
l o s o p h y, a mythical cognition is expressed by myth, and a scientific cognition
is expressed by science. Mythical knowledge is contained in myth itself, re l i g i o u s
k n owledge is contained in religion, philosophical knowledge is contained in
p h i l o s o p h y, and in the same way, scientific knowledge is contained in scien-
ce. Philosophy is contained in philosophising, religion is contained in pre a-
ching, art is contained in writing, painting, and in other expre s s i ve forms, and
science is contained in the scientific research.
Amongst all these various forms of knowledge there are mutual differe n-
ces, and similarities as well. Di f f e rences make them mutually independent,
and similarities make them mutually connected. Their mutual independence
has being developing itself since the human origin till today.
The weaker or stronger domination, and the weaker or stronger presence
of certain forms of knowledge have been manifested during the various times
of human's social existence. There f o re, the human consciousness is divided
into three periods —«three epochs»—, considering which sort of knowledge was
dominant in those periods up till now, following numerous west Eu ro p e a n
standards:
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1. a period during which the dominant knowledge and reinstalled cons-
ciousness is mythology,
2. a period during which the religious knowledge is dominant, upon which an
individual and social consciousness are based, and
3. a period which is characterised by the domination of scientific know l e d-
ge, upon which an individual and socio-collective consciousness is based.
The whole history of man and society in Eu ropean spiritual history has
been divided into three epochs, considering the basic reigning shape of social
consciousness, and considering on what sort of knowledge society was and has
based its existence, its social organisation, and the organisation of life and work
of its man:
1. mythological, 
2. religious and 
3. scientific.
Chronologically observed, the mythological epoch of man's and society's
history was the period that had finished with the ancient world, as historians
of anthropology and other Western scientists call it in its widest sense. The
religious epoch of man's and society's history was not formed by the incep-
tion of religion, but by the fact of its «hipostasis» as the only form of human's
spirit, collective consciousness and state's ideology. The religious epoch deter-
mines and encircles a part of man's history known as the Middle Ages. In those
times the religious epoch formed fundament of not only man's consciousness
but also of social consciousness of that period and of the whole social organi-
sation. Many western scientist, especially naturalists, are saying that the my-
thological and the religious epochs are pre-scientific, in contrast to their mutual
differences, specific qualities and even their contrast. However, together and
parallel with these scientific and pre-scientific forms of cognition in history
of society and of social history of an individual, and together and parallel with
scientific knowledge, the non-scientific form of cognition exists as we l l .
Philosophy and art are usually implied in those non-scientific forms. Ph i l o s o p h y
and art have existed, and they still do exist parallel and together, as to pre -
scientific so to scientific forms of cognition. They cannot be called pre - c o g-
nitional, although they had existed and originated, in formal disciplinary sense
of thinking and existence, even before the inception of science. That is becau-
se, on the one hand, a certain level of scientism cannot be negated to them,
and on the other hand, because these forms of cognition are still present para-
llel and together with scientific cognition.
A new modern era is the era of science. That is the fundamental shape of
k n owledge and a spring of an individual consciousness of the new era, and of
a social consciousness as well. The way that myth represented the basic form
of human and social thinking and cognition in the old age, and religion in the
Middle Ages, in the same way science, in the modern world, has become the
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basic regulation of individual and social consciousness and of their organisation.
In the modern world science has not only gained the status of a citizen, but
has also become a dominant shape of consciousness, behaviour, functioning
and organising of man, and of his society as well.
In the new era the scientific cognition has gained and has a social, and
individually anthropological and ontological status; that is the same status
which the mythological cognition had in the old age, and the same status that
the religious cognition use to have in the Middle Ages. The scientific cognition
has become not only a spring, but also a re t reat for all modern, individual and
social functioning and thinking. It has become if not the only than surely the
p r i m a ry criteria of cognition in general. The validity of each form of cogni-
tion is measured and determined in regard to the scientific cognition. In the
modern world, the foundation of the relationship between man and nature is
an aspiration of man to master nature in any way and with any means. The
modern world, does not only express (substantially the most meaningfully and
the most completely), but it also determines Bacon's identification of know-
ledge and power and of human happiness and life, with the power of re i g n
and control of nature. A practical and material knowledge was then, and has
become since then the basis of human power, while power was and has beco-
me the basis and a condition of human happiness.
Bacon's thought: «tantum possumus quantum scimus» —h ow much we
k n ow is how much we can— most fully expresses and determines a spirit of
the Modern world. Scientific re s e a rch and theoretical interest in anything, and
e ven in nature, is motivated and determined by the aspiration tow a rds an
acquisition of some kind of knowledge. Therefore, the modern world differs
from the ancient world and the Middle Ages in its sense and motif of know-
ledge. In this new era a completely different concept of knowledge has been
d e veloped. An expansion of its practicality and of its field of practical appli-
cability has been reached. Up till then, knowledge was applied only in a field
of acquisition of morally psychological satisfaction and happiness. The prac-
ticality of knowledge was restricted to that. It had a sense of instru c t i o n s ,
tuition, and a sense of leisure l y, attractive and pleasant life. In the modern
world the practical application of knowledge relates, in the first place, to the
practically material, sensuous, appropriate activity of man.
Because of sensuously material neutrality of knowledge in the ancient world
and the Middle Ages, Bacon called those times the childish times of huma-
n i t y, which we re re p resented, determined and reigned by, so called, «child's
science» that was based on «prattle». According to Bacon, only «child's scien-
ce» had existed up till that time. Because of its materially sensuous impracti-
cality he called it prattling. Bacon wrote: «With re g a rd to the usefulness we
h a ve to say openly that it is wisdom, which we have mainly acquired fro m
Greeks, and child's science which makes a man more agile and prattling (which
are the characteristics of children), but is unable and immature for creation».
Up till then, the purpose and the aim of science was in the acquisition of wis-
dom. Bacon rejected wisdom and philosophy of ancient science slightingly
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and with the indignation, because of its sensuously material uselessness and
i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y. Bacon did not demand or expect from knowledge to be a wis-
dom; he did not think that science and philosophy we re ways and methods
of acquisition and invention of wisdom. For him knowledge is knowledge only
if it is useful. A sensuously practical usefulness is the main and only principle
of knowledge.
Bacon had carried on the classification of theoretically scientific fields follo-
wing the principle of classification of intellectually psychological activities of
man. Ac c o rding to him, memory suits to history, fantasy suits to poetry, inte-
llect suits to philosophy and science. Philosophy and science have the same
intellectual principle, they are based on the same intellectually psychological
p ower of man. They are dealing with a study of God, man and nature. There f o re
in Bacon's opinion an intellect has a natural right over nature. But, up till now
this has not been realised. In the introduction to the planned but not finished
w o rk «Great Restoration» ( In s t a u ratio man) Bacon wrote: «The state of scien-
ce is not a happy one and it has not made a big pro g ress; a human intellect
has to have an open way, completely different from the one that has been
k n own till this moment, and another additional means of help should be acqui-
red in order for intellect to use its right on nature».
Ac c o rding to Bacon the main reason that intellect has not achieved its
natural right to reign over nature is that, on the one hand, the intellect itself is
burdened with delusions and false representations, with so called idols, while
on the other hand nor science or philosophy have created a real scientific me-
thod. The limitations of intellect and of unfinished scientific method are
mutually connected and conditioned by the state of spirit of science. A liberation
of intellect from all its idols and an establishment of a scientific method are
simultaneous processes, processes with the same contents. The right of inte-
llect over nature in its essence means possessing and ruling over nature.
In the 20th century, and especially after the Second World Wa r, science
has become a totalitarian power. Certain philosophies of Marxist provenance
and philosophers of critical rationalism have had an expre s s i vely intensive
contempt for unscientific tradition, for unscientific forms of life and for
other traditions. Society and state have found in science the means of ru l i n g
and controlling of individuals. By criticising a totalitarian social role of con-
t e m p o r a ry science, philosophical critique and other critiques of contempo-
r a ry science have pointed out that science had had an emancipatory function
b e f o re it has become a state ideology, in contrast to its today's tyrannical
f u n c t i o n .
Nu m e rous western thinkers are comparing the ancient and the modern
world according to their relationships tow a rd the basic forms of spirit of these
times. They think that science nowadays has a social function and status which
religion use to have. The essence of Spirit and Life of man and of society in
the Middle Ages was in the spirit of religion. Eve rything was determined by
religion, and eve rything was put in service to religion. The basic criteria of
e valuation of eve rything that exist: individual and social, material and spiri-
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tual, past and present and future, of eve rything that should be and that should
not be, is religious knowledge.
Uncritical acceptance of man and society in the Middle Ages resulted fro m ,
a p p e a red, was consisted of, and was conditioned by the character of essence
and by the uniqueness of religious knowledge, as much as a collective, indivi-
dual and social sense was conditioned by the relationship of man and society
of that time tow a rd religion and its knowledge. Historically observed, but
o b s e rved from the aspect of man's knowledge of that time, the religious know-
ledge presented the highest and practically the most utilitarian shape and con-
tents of knowledge for the times when it had appeared, just like the scientific
k n owledge today. Ac c o rding to that, knowledge was accepted wilfully under
the influence and pressure of spiritual surrounding of its social environment,
and when it was socially institutionalised and earthly embodied its protector
was personified into the characters of spiritual and worldly leaders and pro-
tectors.
Capital and Technology
The point of view according to which there is an organic connection betwe e n
Modern and technical rationality in the contemporary philosophy has become
totally and generally accepted. For many contemporary philosophies, inde-
pendently of their ideologically political provenance, the basis of understan-
ding of the contemporary society and of man, and the basis of understanding
of further movement of civilisation and of its meaningfulness, is in techno-
logy and in its rationality. A mutual inner dependency exists between Capital
and Technology.
The transformation of means of work into the machine re p resents an eve n t
of a special historical importance. That event has created a new «modern» man
and a new «modern» society. That is why the question of Modern is insepa-
rable with the question of «modern technology», and because of that philo-
sophy of technology has become a planetary opinion, as K. Akselos has noticed.
Technology as a fundamental expression of modern science has been analy-
sed and examined first of all in its special meaning. Be f o re all that, the writ-
ten documents we re created, and they examined the special problems of
application of technological means on special fields: industry, agriculture, ser-
vice trades, and so on. These re s e a rchers of technology are: A. Fu r g u s o n ,
H . Aleksandrinus, J. Beckmanne, A. Urea, and others.
The consideration of technology, and by the concept of technology it is not
only meant of the modern technology, but also of industry, technology, machi-
nes, means of work and so on, and the consideration of its essence and assump-
tions, re p resent not only the re vealing of the origin of epoch in which we live ,
but also the re vealing of the origin of history. Technology is not a phenome-
non which is the same, similar or a bit more specific to others, not for any
epoch in history, nor for history itself, and certainly not for our epoch —its
n owadays history and its future. Technology is an essence and a foundation
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of each epoch and especially of our epoch. The spirit of a time and a way of life
of a man from that time are expressed in technology, while on the other side
technology produces the content of a spirit, the way of life, a man's whole
social organisation following its historical essence in eve ry given moment.
Since the historical happening of technology is the foundation of a possi-
bility to understand historical happening, then technology is an unavoidable
subject of interest of each contemporary philosophy and of its consideration of
a man, society, their nature, present and future. If it is known and if the fact that
technology and contents of problems that are close to or compatible to tech-
nology, are considered to be a subject of philosophical works of Greek philo-
sophers (we could give an example of ancient Aristotle's philosophy in which
technology had a distinguished place among so called poetical sciences), and
when the present civilisation of Eu rope and the world was at its conception, then
it has become totally obvious that the question of technology later on and
especially nowadays is unavoidable and compulsory for any more serious con-
sideration of man's and society's and history's past, present and future, and
of any historical phenomenon.
The contemporary consideration of technology has for its foundation not
only a history as history, but a history of technology. The history of technology
has its theoretical and its practically pragmatic base as well. The theore t i c a l
base of modern technology is the exact science, while the practical base of tech-
n o l o g y, of its origin and of its rapid and re vo l u t i o n a ry development is the capi-
tal on which the whole organisation of a man's life, of his social community,
of the way of his production and reproduction of life is established.
J. Habermas calls the 19th century a time where the systematic coupling be-
t ween the modern science, capital and technology was established, and during
the 19 century there was a separation of technology into a separate and inde-
pendent re s e a rch field. When the application, the development and the impro-
vement of the technology has become enlarged and re volutionised in the 20th
c e n t u ry, parallel with that the question of technology has provoked intere s t
and has become theoretically and practically more important.
The interest for the observation of technology from different aspects has
been intensely expressed amongst contemporary philosophers in the philo-
sophy of life of Bergson and Sp e n g l e r, in the philosophical anthropology of
Gelen and Se l e r, in the philosophy of existence of Jaspers and He i d e g g e r, in
the critical theory of society of Ho rk h a j m e r, Ma rk u ze and Adorno, in the scien-
tism of L. Koleti, M. Rosi, U. Ceroni, L. Alister and N. Pulankas, by He i d e g g e r ' s
f o l l owers K. Akselos, K. Kosik, by existentialists J. P. Sa rt re and M. M. Po n t y,
by Freud's followers E. From and V. Rajh, and so on. For some of them tech-
nology is man's salutary origin, and for others it is jet another invention in
the line of human inventions which are oppressing, dehumanising and ensla-
ving a man.
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The Dogmatism of Modern
In comparison to the religious Middle Ages, the modern world, Modern, and
the world of the scientific knowledge differentiate from the religious know-
ledge of the Middle Ages only because of the character of knowledge.
But, besides the important differences between the religious and scientific
k n owledge by which the Spirit of the Middle Ages and the Spirit of the modern
world are distinguished, and besides this fundamental difference, there is a
g reat similarity between them. That similarity is in the first place consisted
f rom the relationship between man and society of the Middle Ages, and their
p re vailing shape of knowledge on the one side, and on the other side from the
relationship between man and society of the modern world, and their re i g-
ning knowledge. There are almost no differences between the relationships of
man and society in these historical periods following their dominant shapes
of knowledge that all forms and contents of human life and spirit, and a me-
thod of their whole social organisation and institutionalisation which they are
based on. Both in the modern world —Modern, and in the Middle Ages, man
and society in all manifested forms and institutions and in their entire orga-
nisation and establishment following their specific and established form of
k n owledge have a dogmatic and uncritical re l a t i o n s h i p. As the man and the
society of the Middle Ages had planned and based all of their spiritual, theo-
retical, imaginative and practical activities on the religious knowledge, so the
modern man and society of the modern world has searched for, has found and
has taken the scientific knowledge as their starting point and re t reat of all indi-
vidual and social action and evaluation. Ac c o rd i n g l y, the modern world dif-
fers significantly from the Middle Ages because of the form of knowledge that
is based upon —the modern world is based upon the scientific know l e d g e ,
while the Middle Ages are based upon the religious knowledge, but at the same
time they do not differentiate a lot following the relationships of man and
society, of the modern world and the Middle Ages, and the knowledge upon
which man and society of these periods are based and founded. The distinction
b e t ween these periods considering their foundation and the knowledge is
d i rectly pro p o rtional to their almost the same relationships tow a rds the know-
ledge that they are based and rested upon. As much the difference betwe e n
their dominant knowledge is important, the difference between their re l a-
tionships towards those knowledges is not so important.
A belief in powe r, practicality, and in one word, in utilitarianism of the
religious knowledge in the Middle Ages, and of scientific knowledge in the
modern world re p resents a unique foundation of the relationship betwe e n
these two periods following their determined forms of knowledge, and wi-
thout taking under the consideration that the practicality of these two forms
of knowledge is revealed, verified and consisted of different forms.
The practicality of the scientific knowledge widens the volume and space
of the practicality of the religious knowledge. It also includes the field of man's
w o rk —activity that has in a true sense been formed only with the appearance
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of this knowledge, that is with its becoming as a dominant form of know-
l e d g e .
Although the contemporary phiiosophically anthropological and other
a p p roaches to technology, to its relationship tow a rds man, nature and the
s o c i e t y, are approached differently in their ontological-theoretical, ethnical-
axiological and ideological-political views, the ve ry important is their com-
mon consideration of the modern world, the man and the society from the
aspect of technology and of its influence on other phenomena or on other
influences on technology.
A technical practicality of the scientific knowledge re p resents a specific dif-
ference, and at the same time practicality in comparison to the practicality of
the religious knowledge.
A widening of the practicality of the scientific knowledge in technology in
comparison to the practicality of the religious knowledge represents a signifi-
cant difference in practicality and reality of these forms of knowledge. The
practicality of the religious knowledge is more narrow than the practicality of
the scientific knowledge.
The practicality of the religious knowledge relates in the first place to the
socio-ethnical practice. The applicability, the area of validity of the re l i g i o u s
k n owledge is consisted of the organisation and regulation of social relation in
a more narrow sense, and of institutionalisation and organisation of politi-
cally-legal and moral life of the man and his society.
The practicality of the scientific knowledge, in distinction from the prac-
ticality of the religious knowledge, includes not only politically-legal and moral
practice of man and his society, but also the practice of the material pro d u c t i o n .
The scientific knowledge is a base and a support of the whole practice of man's
and society's activities and thinking.
Ac c o rd i n g l y, the religious and the scientific knowledge do not differe n t i a-
te only in their qualitative sense, but also in the volume of practicality of these
two sorts of knowledge.
The Middle Ages and the modern world both individually and socially
have the same, completely uncritical relationship towards their forms of acti-
v i t y, contrary and independently from the mentioned differences betwe e n
them and from the periods of their validity.
An uncritical and dogmatic relationship tow a rds the knowledge of one's ow n
time, both the Middle Ages and the modern world are creating a false, inaccu-
rate and alienated —so called Ideologised individual and social consciousness
a c c o rding to the character and meaning of these knowledges as for an indivi-
dual so for the community that they are reigning over and on which they are
established. The existing social belief in the power and pro g ression of these know-
ledges, has margionalised, excommunicated and proclaimed the heresy of the
attempt to critically observe and consider their roles. These knowledges are pro-
claimed to be the only criteria and the only base of evaluation of all forms of the
individual and social activities and existence. They are taken as the basis for living
and for all practical activities as of the individual so of the social community.
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Science has its stiff and schematised methodological rules of concept's for-
mation. In it, as a rule, «the one class of principles is taken as a universal, and
as the only starting point in order to reach the truth, Rightness and Intellect.
Everything else is taken as unwanted, unfit and unclear». Science creates and
aims to create a specific rationality. Re s p e c t i ve l y, science itself is one unique
r a t i o n a l i t y. But, science is a rationality which exist parallel to and together
with the other forms of rationality, independently from the fact that science
is very instrumental and powerful. The aspiration for disputing and questio-
ning of any other forms of rationality, and by becoming the measure of ratio-
nalism in general, the science cannot sincerely become all embracing rationality.
By denying of other forms of rationality, the scientific rationality is not really
abolishing them. Science, according to its forms of manifestation, is pre s e n-
ting a strong level of intolerance and exc l u s i veness in relation with other forms
of rationality or irrationality. Thomas Kuhn and Paul Fe yerabend, amongst
others, have opposed that hard and intolerant attitude of the scientific ratio-
nality in relation to other rationality which differentiate in their forms and
contents. They are trying to take away the meaning of the scientific rationality's
scientific hypostasis by its relativism on the pluralist scene of rationality which
are based on different cultures and traditions.
Thomas Kuhn and Paul Fe yerabend are relativising and oppressing the
scientific rationality by observing the scientific rationality historically, that is
in the time and space in which it exists, considering the tradition from which
it originates, considering that the scientific rationality modifies itself cons-
tantly, and together with its development and with the development of tech-
n o l o g y, changes its forms and the contents of manifestation more rapidly. They
a re observing it without taking under the consideration its technical powe r
and utilitarianism, like the scientific rationality does itself by creating on the
basis of that a picture of its priority and absoluteness in comparison with the
other forms of cognition, knowledge, life and rationality, but form the aspect
of its existence in the entire pluralism of scientific and unscientific forms of
cognition and life.
Fe yerabend is not observing the scientific rationality and knowledge fro m
the aspect of their technical powe r, as the knowledge does itself. He considers
k n owledge as one of many instruments of the man's relationship with his envi-
ronment, and with the World. As such the knowledge is not the only and wi-
thout mistakes. With its instrumentalisation in technology and by it, the
k n owledge has become a significant social authority and the well of power and
omnipotence.
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